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Masculinity, Nationhood,
and the Military in Israel
and Singapore
Isaac Tham

Introduction
On January 4th 2017, my eighteen-year-old self waved goodbye to my
anxious parents before being taken by ship to an offshore military camp. I
was shaved bald, issued green pixelated uniforms, and shown to a decrepit
dormitory which fifteen similarly clueless compatriots and I would call home
for the next two years. Standing at attention at the daily flag-raising ceremony,
I learned to salute the flag of my country, the country I would train to
protect: not the Star of David, but five white stars and a crescent moon.
Just like Israel, Singapore implements mandatory military service.
While compulsory conscription is for males for a period of two years in
Singapore, in Israel men serve for three years while women only have to
serve for two. Conscription has been an integral part of both countries’
national policies since they were each founded. This article examines the link
between masculinity, military, and nationhood in Israel and Singapore – two
small, relatively young nation-states established amidst a hostile regional
environment dominated by another ethnic majority. Both states have had
masculine discourses associated with nation-building and have used the
military to institutionalize a hegemonic masculinity. I argue that the military
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has had a significantly greater impact on masculine norms in Israel, which
emphasize the role of the protector, than on masculine norms in Singapore,
which focus more on the role of the provider. The stronger link between the
military and nationhood, and the resultant greater ties to masculinity, are due
to males’ greater willingness to protect their country from danger in Israel
than in Singapore. The greater willingness to serve in Israel is due to a stronger
sense of nationhood, while the stronger perception of protecting the country
stems from the greater tangible threat to Israel than to Singapore.
This paper draws upon a diverse range of sources, including books and
journal articles exploring masculinity, military, and citizenship conceptually,
and many apply to Israel and Singapore specifically. As a Singaporean citizen,
I incorporate a first-hand perspective on military service in Singapore. I also
conducted surveys among Singaporean youths who have recently completed
their military service, and I interviewed an ex-Brigadier General of the
Singapore Armed Forces.
This paper begins with a theoretical discussion of the concepts of
masculinity and nationalism. It then explores the masculinization of nationbuilding and the military in Israel and Singapore. The paper dives into the
differences between Singapore and Israel, which build up to the proposition
that the strength of the military-nationhood relationship rests upon both
the male citizens’ willingness to protect, and perception of protecting the
country from danger. This military-nationhood relationship determines
the significance of the role of a protector in the hegemonic masculinity of
Israel and Singapore. I will also examine the state’s response to the differing
military-masculinity relationship, concluding that Singapore’s military
reinforces masculine norms associated with non-military societies. The
last part of the paper explores how cultural changes in Israel threaten the
military-nationhood compact and shift Israel’s masculine norms toward those
currently seen in Singapore, raising serious long-term security concerns for the
threatened nation-state.
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Masculinity
The repeated mention of masculinity raises definitional questions – what
is masculinity?
Masculinity is defined as the “traits and qualities conventionally
associated with boys and men.”1 Masculinity as a concept was popularized by
the rise of male studies in the 1980s. Many scholars in masculinity studies
consider masculinity to be a social construction, circumscribed by norms
applied to boys and men in a given culture.
Most scholars agree that there is no universal standard of masculinity,2
but a “ubiquitous male” exists in many cultures based on the common criteria
of impregnating women, providing dependents with resources to live a good
life, and protecting dependents from danger. The concept of protection
implies that one places himself in a dangerous or risky situation to shield
others from facing danger.
Protecting and providing are the two main masculine roles that this essay
refers to. Observing common features that define the core of the masculine is
the essentialist way of analyzing masculinity.3
Another way of analyzing masculinity is via the normative approach,
which emphasizes the idealized notion of male behavior. Many U.S. and
European organizations embodied male codes of honor, which stressed “manly
virtues” like willpower, strength, honor, and courage. In any society, in any
time, there exists an identifiable normative “hegemonic masculinity,” an ideal
type which sets the standards for male demeanor, thinking and action.4 This
notion deconstructs the image of a unified masculinity – for there exist many
alternative masculinities which are constructed and compared in relation to
the hegemonic masculinity. Implicit in the concept of masculinity as socially
constructed is the notion that masculinity is changeable and mutable.
Nationalism and Nation-Building
Next, we shall explore the concept of a nation. A nation is defined by
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Max Weber as “a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest
itself in a state.” Nationalism, or a sense of national consciousness, is a goal to
achieve both statehood, and a belief in a collective commonality.5
Nations engage in nation-building with the aim of strengthening a
national identity. This involves developing the notion of a national past and
present,6 creating traditions,7 and symbolically constructing commonality.8
Masculinity and Nationalism
We will now examine the link between masculinity and nationalism.
The culture of nationalism emphasizes, and resonates with, masculine
themes. Values such as honor, bravery, duty, and patriotism are closely tied
to both masculinity and nationalism. Additionally, notions of nationalism
involve defending and protecting the nation-state, and protecting is one key
masculine role in the essentialist view of masculinity.
Israel – Concepts of the New Jewish Male
The Zionism movement arose from 19th century European nationalism,
which led to a desire for a “return” to Zion, the natural homeland, and assert
sovereign control over it.
The Zionism movement for creating a Jewish national homeland involved
significant notions of masculinity. It gained traction against the backdrop of
19th century anti-Semitic European sentiments depicting the Jewish man
as effeminate, passive, and defective.9 At that time, the political inferiority
of Jews was encoded both in racial and gender terms – men were perceived
as feeble-bodied and emasculate. The Zionist revolution radically rethought
the image of the Jewish people, with the concept of “New Jew,” symbolized
by an emerging healthy, strong male body. The New Jew was the answer
to the imagery of the effeminate, weak body that had tainted the common
perception of Jews, from Jews and non-Jews alike. This solution led to the
creation of the new Jewish “Sabra” archetype, which contrasted with the
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European-ghettoized Jewish stereotype of being old, weak and cowardly.10 The
attainment of a “proper” masculinity is seen as an integral part of the national
project, and was conceived as a process of regeneration.
Hence, masculinity, or specifically, the desire to assert a new, stronger
masculine form and reject existing stereotypes, was a key driver of Zionist
nationalism.
With the ultimate goal of nationalism being to establish a state, the
Zionism nationalist project involved building and protecting a growing
Jewish state. Building the state involved hard physical labor, and protecting it
involved risking of many lives to fight for the Jewish settlements in Palestine,
which were facing increasing hostility from the neighboring Arab states. These
roles emphasized the corporeal traits of physical strength, further contributing
to the masculinization of the Jewish nationalism. One of the iconic figures
of Zionism was the male haluz, a pioneer holding a plow in one hand and
a rifle in another, with his female counterpart standing ready to help him.
Hence, masculinity became a prerequisite of “good citizenship” in the Jewish
community in Palestine in the 1920s, and in the formation of Israel the idea
of the new Jewish man carried huge significance as a national sign: a healthy
male body was seen as symbolizing a healthy, vital nation.11
The relationship between masculinity and nationalism is cyclical in Israel
– masculinity led to nationalism, and the nationalist movement led to an
increased significance of masculine roles.
Singapore – Constructed Masculinity for an Accidental Nation
In contrast with the Zionist project, Singapore did not have strong
nationalist sentiments prior to its formation as a state. Singapore is often
called an “accidental nation”12 as its creation was unplanned and its survival
was unexpected. Singapore’s founding political leadership did not believe that
Singapore could or should be an independent state, having campaigned for
a political union with Malaysia in 1959. Singapore became a sovereign state
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in 1965 after being expelled from this union due to what was then seen as
irrevocable differences between the Chinese-dominated Singapore population
and the Malay-majority Malaysian population.
Hence, the new Singapore state had to construct the Singaporean nation.
As established earlier, nation-building involves constructing commonality.
Singapore’s population was comprised of immigrants from all over the region,
including multicultural immigrants without a shared ethnic loyalty. Without
any ethnic commonality among the Singaporean people, an ethnic national
identity was not possible, unlike in Israel’s situation. The Singapore nation
was thus conceptualized ideologically on the grounds of common material
interests, values, and goals, rather than a sense of primordial loyalty to a preexisting cultural form,13 or in other words, a civic national identity.
Singapore’s national identity is based on the founding principles
of equality in a multiracial society, and the common vision for material
economic progress, enshrined by the national pledge “to achieve happiness,
prosperity and progress for our nation.”
With nation-building also comes the creation of a national narrative,
and for Singapore this narrative is one of survival and fragility that emerged
from the political leadership. Singapore, a small nation in a hostile regional
environment, was vulnerable to security threats such as Konfrantasi
(Confrontation), Indonesian state-sponsored terrorism against Singapore
and Malaysia from 1963-1966. Furthermore, Singapore was economically
vulnerable, having no natural resources and high unemployment.
Considering the common vision for materialistic progress and the
country’s vulnerability, the Singaporean political leadership insisted that the
development of masculine ideals was essential, and that a society dominated
by stereotypical feminine characteristics, such as softness, would spell doom
for the young nation.14 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew exhorted Singaporeans
to be “highly-disciplined, strong, with tremendous qualities of stamina,
endurance and, at the same time, having great intellectual discipline.” Hence,
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Singapore constructed a national “hegemonic masculinity,” a masculine
dynamism characterized by rugged individualism, instrumental rationality
and pragmatism.
Given the majority Chinese population and the Chinese-dominated
political leadership, the paradigm of Chinese masculinity was also influential
in shaping Singapore’s national masculinity. Chinese conceptions of
normative masculinity are characterized by the dyad wen-wu; wen refers to
scholarly mastery of cultural works, and wu refers to martial prowess and
physical strength. In the Singaporean context, the constitution of a hegemonic
Chinese masculine identity lies somewhere along the continuum of economic
success as a modern form of wen, and the wu of compulsory military training
service.15
The link between masculinity and nationhood in Singapore is only oneway: masculine discourses are constructed in the nation-building project to
provide a common narrative and values for the population to work towards.
As masculinity and nationhood were not mutually reinforcing, as seen in
Israel, some argue that the link between masculinity and nationhood is weaker
in Singapore.
The Military
Armed forces protect a state from internal and external threats, and the
idea of protection is also the nexus between masculinity and nationalism. The
institution of the military forms and reinforces the link between masculinity
and nationalism. The institutionalization of masculine norms in nationhood
through the military is seen in both Israel and Singapore.
Israel
Israel’s sovereignty as a state was hard-fought, won after the War of
Independence in 1948. This feat created a basic sense of shared destiny among
Israel’s population, making the military a key part of Israeli identity. The link
12 • Kedma

between nation, military, and masculinity was institutionalized in the state’s
early years with the establishment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as the
central institution of the new state, cementing the definition of the New Jew
as the active male soldier’s body.
Since Israel’s foundation in 1948, there has been a huge focus on selfdefense, and the country has had mandatory conscription beginning at the
age of 18 for its male and female Jewish citizens. Males are required to serve
in the military for 32 months, and females for 24 months.
The government, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, elevated
the status of the IDF soldier to become the symbol of the modern Israeli
state, masculinized and militarized. The concept of an Israeli soldier-citizen,
a “natural body” that seamlessly shifts between battlefield and civilian life,
emerged over time, reflecting the blurring distinction between the civilian
and military spheres in Israel and degree to which Israeli society has been
militarized.
Singapore
In Singapore, all male citizens and permanent residents who reach the age
of 16 ½ years are liable for two years of compulsory military service, better
known in Singapore as National Service (NS), and thereafter join the reserve
forces, attending in-camp training for several days each year until the age of
40.16
Even in today’s geopolitical context where direct armed conflict with
regional neighbors is unlikely, the Singaporean state uses the vulnerability
narrative to justify the necessity of the National Service policy. National
Service “has become and will continue to be the most non-negotiable aspect
of Singapore citizenship.”17
National Service is regarded as a masculinizing activity in Singapore.
Since only male citizens serve, it is an exclusively masculine expression
of citizenship. It is also viewed as a rite of passage for boys. This rite is
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encapsulated in Ah Boys To Men, a movie chronicling the journey of several
Singaporean males throughout their basic military training. The immense
popularity of the movie, which became the highest-grossing Singaporean
film of all time, goes to show that National Service is a key feature of the
Singaporean identity, which many males identify as their greatest act of service
to the nation.
Hence, Singapore’s national service policy can be seen as the
institutionalization of the hegemonic national masculinity of wen wu18
through military service to the nation. What types of masculine norms
exactly? This will be explored later.
Comparing Military, Masculinity and Nation-Building in Israel and
Singapore
Although Singapore and Israel have several similarities, they have an
extremely different relationship between military, masculinity, and nationbuilding, which I will analyze in this section.
Israel has a far stronger sense of nationhood than Singapore. The Zionist
nationalism project started in the 19th century, and the fighting and efforts
of the Zionist Jews directly led to the establishment of the state of Israel.
Statehood is considered an achievement for the Jewish people. Additionally,
the ethnic commonality between Jews has an extremely long history stretching
back two thousand years. In contrast, Singapore was an “accidental” nation,
and the sense of nationhood was constructed by the government through
nation-building processes. When comparing a deeply-rooted ethnic national
identity with an authoritarian constructed civic national identity, one could
predict that Israel’s national identity would be stronger than Singapore’s.
With a greater sense of nationhood comes a greater willingness to fight
for the nationhood and protect the country from danger. Interviews with IDF
soldiers show that the reason for their high motivation to enlist and risk their
lives is that they are contributing to the country.19 In contrast, a survey on
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Singaporean youths showed that 58% thought that most Singaporeans would
not be willing to risk their lives to protect the country.
Israel faces a far more urgent threat to its nationhood than Singapore
does. Israel is not recognized as a state by 32 United Nations member states,
mostly Muslim states, and these states treat Israel as an enemy. Israel is
constantly being threatened by Palestine, with Palestinian terrorist group
Hamas frequently launching rockets into Israeli territory. The most recent
military conflict between Israel and Hamas was the seven week-long 2014
Israel-Gaza conflict, during which 73 Israelis were killed and 469 were
wounded. On the other hand, Singapore faces little to no deaths from
conflict or terrorism, with a handful of military deaths solely due to training
incidents. Singapore has peaceful diplomatic relations with South-east Asia
through the ASEAN, an organization billed by many as “a miracle, a catalyst
for peace.”20 ASEAN includes Malaysia and Indonesia, the very countries
that were deemed most threatening to Singapore in the early nation-building
days. Chiang, an ex-Brigadier General of the Singapore Armed Forces,
acknowledges that “at an ideological level, Singaporean males do not regard
NS as a necessity because they do not think there is an existential threat to
Singapore.”21
With a greater threat to nationhood, there is a greater perception of
danger accompanying military service. The risk of injury or death of soldiers
due to combat is significant in Israel, and this a huge emotional burden that
parents face when raising their sons in Israel. Israeli parents dread the “three
knocks on the door,”22 referring to when army representatives come to inform
a family of their son’s death. Even though military service generally exposes
one to more safety risks, the lack of conflict and combat means that the risk of
death is almost non-existent in Singapore.
As a result of the differing perceptions of danger accompanying military
service, Israelis and Singaporeans have different perceptions of the extent to
which they are willing to protect their country from danger through military
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service. As mentioned earlier, the notion of protecting involves putting oneself
in danger to prevent others from having to face that danger. Israeli soldiers
are “highly motivated” and “willing to give their lives, as they know their
actions are directed toward saving their family and country.”23 In the case of
Singapore, with the lack of serious conflict, the main role of military service
is deterrence from foreign threats; therefore, the link between serving NS and
protecting Singapore is tenuous.
The link between the military and nationhood depends on both the
willingness to protect and the perception of protecting a country from danger.
Firstly, according to the republican notion of citizenship, serving in the
military is regarded as one’s contribution to the nation and one’s expression of
citizenship.24 One’s interest in contributing to his nation is dependent upon
his sense of national identity. Hence, the strength of one’s national identity
determines his willingness to serve in the military. Secondly, since the role of
the military is to protect the sovereignty of the nation-state against threats, the
extent to which citizens view military service as protecting the country affects
the military-nationhood link in that country.
Due to its greater willingness to protect, as well as its greater sense of
protecting the county from danger, Israel shas a stronger military-nationhood
link than Singapore.
Masculine Norms in Israel and Singapore
As we have established, protecting and providing are two key masculine
norms. Due to the stronger military-nationhood link in Israel, there is a
greater importance of protecting the hegemonic masculine norms of Israel,
where the role of the provider is more significant than in Singapore.
In Israel, the military is very closely linked to masculinity due to the clear
relationship with the masculine role of protecting. Sasson-Levy25 found that
combatant roles are regarded as a prestigious contribution to the community
and a proof of an individual’s masculinity. Since military service is perceived
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as the fundamental expression of an individual’s commitment to the Israeli
state, the rank that a soldier achieves during his military service affects his
sense of belonging to Israel, and also determines one’s accessibility to different
social resources after release from the army. The masculinity of the combat
soldier has achieved hegemonic status, becoming a social ideal and an emblem
of masculinity and citizenship in general. This hegemony is expressed through
a wide range of phenomena, such as economic benefits for combat soldiers,
their symbolic social power, and their political power.
In contrast, hegemonic masculinity is constructed around the role
of the provider in the more materialistic society of Singapore. A survey
on Singaporean university students found that being the breadwinner for
the family is an important masculine norm, among other traits perceived
to be associated with or desirable for men in Western cultures, including
responsibility, determination, and decisiveness. A survey of Singapore males
who had just finished their military service revealed that 57% believe that
serving NS contributes significantly to masculine norms in Singapore.
Considering these males had just finished their military service, this weak
majority is expected to further weaken over time as they enter university
and the workforce, and face economic concerns that further affect their
masculinity. In an interview, Chiang confirmed this sentiment, saying that “at
30, nobody cares what you did during NS.”
Hegemonic Masculinity and The State
Currently, the hegemonic masculinity in Israel leads to greater willingness
and motivation of boys to serve in the military to protect the country.
Kolonimus and Bar-Tal’s research on 100 combat soldiers26 found that Israeli
combat soldiers were determined and highly-motivated to enlist in combat
units, listing the opportunity for contribution to the country as the key
motivating factor.27 Viewing violent action as a factor that confirms their
masculinity, these soldiers symbolize the full connection between masculinity
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and nationality with their bodies through combat.
Hence, we see that the military-nationhood relationship and masculine
norms are mutually reinforcing. When the military-nationhood relationship
is stronger, Israel’s hegemonic masculine norms are constructed to a greater
extent around the role of protecting. Since hegemonic masculinity is a
normative ideal that males strive for, Israeli males will have greater motivation
to protect the country, reinforcing the military-nationhood relationship.
This mutually reinforcing cycle is beneficial for states like Israel,
which need to continuously recruit motivated men to serve in the military.
Politicians worldwide have utilized ideologies of hegemonic masculinity to
encourage young men to join the army.28 The state has a vested interest in
maintaining strong ideological links between masculinity and militarism. If
the relationship between masculinity and the military is weakened, so too
is the state’s power to motivate young men to serve in the army, leading to
defense concerns for the country.29
Chiang observes that Singaporean youth, in contrast, “generally view
national service negatively, unlike Israeli youth.”30 This is corroborated with
interviews with recently-discharged Singaporeans, who were not “particularly
motivated to enlist” due to the lack of conflict and also due to the fact that
NS is an obligation.
The Singapore Army recognizes that role of protecting in Singapore’s
hegemonic masculine norms is weak. Despite this, National Service is still
considered a key masculinizing exercise, being a “rite of passage into both
adult manhood and full citizenship.” Another way to interpret the response
of the survey on Singaporeans mentioned earlier is that a majority (57%)
feel that NS contributes to masculinity, which agrees with the view presented
above. These two seemingly opposing perspectives can be reconciled by the
conclusion that NS cultivates masculine values that are distinctly different
from protecting the country which we see in Israel. In an interview, Chiang
outlined the military leadership and government’s aims of NS: to develop
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Singaporean males on a personal level – inculcating values such as mental
strength, responsibility and self-reliance, social level – fostering teamwork
and care for others, and national level – building loyalty and patriotism to
Singapore. Undeniably, many of these traits are masculine, but few of them
are directly related to combat and protecting the country. In fact, these
characteristics are not unlike the Western masculine values of responsibility,
determination, and decisiveness,31 which are associated more with economic
success than military success and hence the masculine notions of providing
rather than protecting. Interestingly, this shows that the military in Singapore
institutionalizes a hegemonic masculinity consistent with non-militarized
society.
Hence, the way that the military serves to perpetuate masculine norms is
different between Israel and Singapore.
Israel Risks Becoming Like Singapore
In recent years, Israel has witnessed a cultural shift away from combat
roles – materialism is more pronounced and there is a lower tolerance from
the public of the loss of life. Another catalyst for this shift is that the army
no longer makes combat service compulsory for cadets, and prestige has been
added to army roles which are less dangerous.32
Additionally, parental intervention and scrutiny on the army has
increased. Recent interviews with commanders show their frustration with
constant calls from anxious parents worried about their sons’ safety. The need
to allay parents’ anxiety has led to many training procedures being altered
to increase safety, but to the point where training is “overly safe,” inhibiting
realism. This is similar to Singapore, where safety has a foremost priority for
the Army. Safety was added as an Army Core Value in 2013, and numerous
detailed safety frameworks and procedures have recently been implemented.
Furthermore, Mann-Shalvi has observed that many Israeli parents raise
their sons to adopt feminine traits, “unconsciously combating their sons’
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masculine qualities by encouraging traits diametrically opposed to bravery
and courageousness,” with the aim of directing their sons away from combat
units.33
Hence, we see the hegemonic masculinity of the combat soldier which
emphasizes the role of the protector is being increasingly challenged, due
to the steady deinstitutionalization of the link between masculinity and the
military through the removal of compulsory combat roles for males. With the
lower tolerance of danger and life-risking behavior, I posit that in the longrun, Israel may become increasingly like Singapore – a materialistic society
where the role of the protector has decreased significance in the society’s
hegemonic masculinity. This will decrease the motivation for Israeli boys to
serve in combat roles in the military as they conflict with their attainment
of the other masculine norm – that of the economic provider – through
recruitment into technology-savvy combat vocations that prepare them better
for their career.34 There are already signs of this happening, the percentage of
Israeli males showing motivation to serve in combat units has dropped from
80% in 2010 to just 67% in 2017.35 And sure enough, the IDF has in recent
years faced increasing difficulty in enlisting soldiers for combat units – in
2004, 77% of Jewish boys enlisted, compared to only 72% in 2016.
Compared to Singapore with a much lower tangible threat to the nation,
Israel faces serious danger if it fails to recruit enough motivated combat
soldiers to protect the country due to its ever-present security threats. Israel’s
enemies would definitely be ready to capitalize on any weakness in Israel’s
defense to threaten the country’s sovereignty.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the comparison between Singapore and Israel shows that
hegemonic masculinity is culturally constructed and is indeed changeable
over time. Israel has a stronger sense of nationhood and a greater threat
to its nationhood than Singapore, so Israeli males are more willing to
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protect the nation, as well as have a greater perception of protecting the
nation from danger through compulsory military service. This stronger
military-nationhood link explains why the hegemonic masculine norms
in Israel revolve around protecting, as opposed to providing in Singapore.
Furthermore, this feeds a mutually reinforcing cycle which ensures a constant
stream of males motivated to protect Israel through military service, which
is beneficial to Israel. However, this cycle is showing signs of breaking down
due to cultural changes that threaten to make Israel’s state of hegemonic
masculinity converge toward Singapore’s. Singapore’s military reinforces a
hegemonic masculinity constructed around the provider role consistent with a
non-militarized country, which is fine for Singapore, but not for the far more
vulnerable state of Israel, and the attendant consequences of lower soldier
motivation and willingness to serve will be detrimental to the state’s security.

Isaac Tham is a freshman from Singapore. He is not a crazy rich Asian, though by
studying economics he hopes to become one some day.
Endnotes
1.

Griffin, Gabriele. "A Dictionary of Gender Studies." Dominant Social Paradigm Oxford Reference. October 04, 2017. http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780191834837.001.0001/acref-9780191834837.

2.

Gilmore, David D. Manhood in the making: Cultural concepts of masculinity. Yale
University Press, 1990.

3.

Connell, Robert W. "Masculinities. Berkeley." (1995).

4.

Mosse George, L. "The image of man: the creation of modern masculinity." New York:
Oxford UP (1996).

5.

Nagel, Joane. "Masculinity and nationalism: Gender and sexuality in the making of
nations." Ethnic and racial studies 21, no. 2 (1998): 242-269.

6.

Anderson, Benedict. "Imagined Communities, revised edition." London and New (1991).

		Series II Issue Number 1i1 Spring 2019/5779 •

21

7.

Hobsbawm, Eric. "Introduction: inventing traditions." The invention of tradition 1
(1983): 13-14.

8.

Cohen, Anthony. "The symbolic construction of community, 1985." London: Tavistock
(1992).

9.

Sharim, Yehuda. "Choreographing Masculinity in Contemporary Israeli Culture."
Choreographies of 21st Century Wars (2016): 133-156.

10. Ben-Ari, Eyal, and Edna Levy-Schreiber. Body-building, character-building, and nationbuilding: Gender and military service in Israel. na, 2000.
11. Mosse George, L. "The image of man: the creation of modern masculinity." New York:
Oxford UP (1996).
12. Mahbubani, K. "So, What Is a Singaporean?" The Straits Times, June 10, 2013. http://
www.mahbubani.net/articles by dean/So-what-is-a-Singaporean.pdf.
13. Hudson, Chris. "From rugged individual to dishy dad: Reinventing masculinity in
Singapore." Genders 54 (2011).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Tan, Kenneth Paul Andrew Sze-Sian. "Civic society and the new economy in
patriarchal Singapore: Emasculating the political, feminizing the public." Crossroads: An
interdisciplinary journal of Southeast Asian studies (2001): 95-122.
17. Ibid, 95-122.
18. Hudson, Chris. "From rugged individual to dishy dad: Reinventing masculinity in
Singapore." Genders 54 (2011).
19. Mann-Shalvi, Hanni. From Ultrasound to Army: The Unconscious Trajectories of
Masculinity in Israel. Karnac Books, 2016.
20. Mahbubani, Kishore, and Jeffrey Sng. The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018.
21. Chiang, Hock Woon. "Young Singaporeans’ Perspectives of Compulsory Military
Conscription: How they manage the national service experience in relation to their
education, development and careers." PhD diss., University of Leicester, 2012.
22. Ibid.

22 • Kedma

23. Ibid.
24. Shafir, Gershon, and Yoav Peled. "Citizenship and stratification in an ethnic democracy."
Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 3 (1998): 408-427.
25. Sasson‐Levy, Orna. "Constructing identities at the margins: Masculinities and citizenship
in the Israeli army." Sociological Quarterly 43, no. 3 (2002): 357-383.
26. Bar-Tal, Daniel. Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics.
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
27. Mann-Shalvi, Hanni. From Ultrasound to Army: The Unconscious Trajectories of
Masculinity in Israel. Karnac Books, 2016.
28. Nagel, Joane. "Masculinity and nationalism: Gender and sexuality in the making of
nations." Ethnic and racial studies 21, no. 2 (1998): 242-269.
29. Higate, Paul, and John Hopton. "WAR, MILITARISM." Handbook of studies on men
and masculinities (2004): 432.
30. Chiang, Hock Woon. "Young Singaporeans’ Perspectives of Compulsory Military
Conscription: How they manage the national service experience in relation to their
education, development and careers." PhD diss., University of Leicester, 2012.
31. Wong, Y. Joel, Moon-Ho Ringo Ho, Shu-Yi Wang, and Adam R. Fisher. "Subjective
masculine norms among university students in Singapore: A mixed-methods study."
Psychology of Men & Masculinity 17, no. 1 (2016): 30.
32. Mann-Shalvi, Hanni. From Ultrasound to Army: The Unconscious Trajectories of
Masculinity in Israel. Karnac Books, 2016.
33. Ibid.
34. Harel, Amos. "With Top Recruits Opting out of Combat Roles, Israeli Army Must Set
Firm Rules." Haaretz.com. March 16, 2018. Accessed December 07, 2018. https://www.
haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-top-tier-idf-recruits-spurning-combat-service-fortech-units-1.5910826.
35. "IDF Enlistment Drops, Not Combat Motivation." The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com.
December 16, 2017. Accessed December 07, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/
IDF-enlistment-drops-not-combat-motivation-518121.

		Series II Issue Number 1i1 Spring 2019/5779 •

23

